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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

PROTECTING ONLINE PRIVACY

Online privacy has become one of the greatest concerns in the United States
today. There are currently multiple stakeholders with interests in online privacy
including the public, industry, and the United States government. This study examines
the issues surrounding the protection of online privacy. Privacy laws in the United States
are currently outdated and do little to protect online privacy. These laws are unlikely to
be changed as both the government and industry have interests in keeping these privacy
laws lax. To bridge the gap between the desired level of online privacy and what is
provided legally users may turn to technological solutions.
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Protecting Online Privacy
The Internet has grown in importance in the United States with 87% of adults reporting
that they used the Internet in 2013 (Pew Research Center, 2014). This is a significant
increase from the 14% of adults that reported using the Internet in 1995 which was only a
few years after the Internet was first introduced commercially (Pew Research Center,
2014). The widespread use of the Internet has played an integral part in shaping the
United States today by breaking down communication barriers and opening doors for the
average person to be a content creator. These changes have sparked public debates about
rights and regulations in a digital age. At the center of these debates is the nature of what
is considered public, and what is considered to be private.
The line between public and private has become blurred online (Barnes, 2006; Strauß &
Nentwich, 2013). Information that is typically only shared with specific people in an
offline setting is widely available to others online (Albanesius, 2010). This phenomenon
is even more pronounced when examining social platforms which are based around
sharing personal information online (Chen & Michael, 2012). With social media
currently being used by 70% of all Internet users (Duggen et al., 2015), people are
moving more of their lives online. Despite the tendency to publically post information in
places easily accessible (like social media), users express feelings of their privacy being
violated when the information is accessed by an unintended audience (Barnes, 2006).
Online privacy has been a popular topic in academic research for over a decade.
However, the concept of online privacy was pushed into popular media after Edward
Snowden leaked classified National Security Agency documents in 2013 (Preibusch,
2015). After the Snowden revelations most Americans believe that their privacy is being
1

threatened (Madden, 2014) with 66% of adults stating that the current laws are not
enough to protect online privacy (Rainie, Kiesler, Kang, & Madden, 2013). Though this
feeling is prevalent there is little research into how online privacy is protected in the
United States. This study seeks to explore the online privacy protections available to
users.

1.1 Online Privacy
Even though there is an expressed concern for online privacy in both popular culture and
research, online privacy does not have a consistent definition. This is partly because
privacy is a difficult term to define since the term itself is highly subjective. Since one of
the ways that privacy definitions vary is by culture our definition of privacy will be
limited to the United States. Privacy must be conceptualized in the context of online
activity since there are significant differences between the offline and online worlds.
Many offline activities can be conducted without any observation of others which means
privacy can be conceptualized in terms of secrecy (Kemp & Moore, 2007). However,
any activity online leaves behind a trail of information also known as a digital footprint
(Weaver & Gahegan, 2007). A digital footprint can be composed of numerous types of
information including metadata (e.g. location, Internet Protocol address), search history,
email, and social media posts (Steve, 2013). A user’s digital footprint is what the
majority of online privacy research is concerned about either in part or in whole (Moore,
2012). The most common definition of online privacy is derived from this idea of a user
owning and managing their digital footprint. This conceptualization of online privacy
examines privacy as a form of control. This means that the more control the user has
over their digital footprint; the more privacy they have (Kemp & Moore, 2007; Moore,
2

2008). However, the concept of online privacy is more complex than just being a form of
control over a digital footprint. This definition leaves out phenomena that has been
observed by researchers on social networking sites. Users of social networking sites do
not always feel that their privacy has been violated when information is posted about
them to the site (Levin & Abril, 2009). If the definition of privacy as control over
information was completely accepted, this circumstance should result in a privacy
violation from users since they have no control over the information being posted.
However, users do express a privacy violation when information is shared outside of their
social network (Levin & Abril, 2009). The theory of communication privacy
management can explain this part of online privacy.
1.2 Communication Privacy Management
Communication privacy management (CPM) provides a framework for understanding
how people create and maintain privacy boundaries. This theory is based on the core
concept that people see themselves as owners of their private information (Petronio,
2010). Because they own this information they feel that they have a right to control this
information. This fits neatly with how laws, organizations, and researchers see online
privacy as a form of control. When this control is lost in some way, like being shared
without consent, they feel as if their privacy has been violated (Petronio, 2010). This
concept is demonstrated online when online platforms share their user’s information with
a third party. If the user did not feel that they gave permission for their information to be
used that way, they expressed that their privacy had been violated (Rainie & Duggen,
2016).
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When an owner of private information discloses that information to third party, the third
party then becomes a co-owner of that information. All owners of the private
information have a degree of control over the information. How much control an owner
has is negotiated depending on the situation and the information (Petronio, 2010). This
negotiation process can vary greatly. For instance, privacy negotiation can be explicit
(“don’t tell anyone”) or implied (taking someone aside to tell them/sending a private
message) (Kennedy-Lightsey et al., 2012). The rules resulting from the negotiation detail
how, with, and who the information can be shared. When someone breaks these rules
either intentionally or unintentionally, boundary turbulence results (Kennedy-Lightsey et
al., 2012; Petronio, 2010). In the situation with the online platform and the user, the user
disclosed some information to the online platform for the platform to use. When the
platform disclosed this information to a third party it violated the privacy rules from the
view of the user since they did not give consent for the third party to use the information.
After the privacy violation the user experiences boundary turbulence, which in this case
manifests itself as distrust in the online platform (Rainie & Duggen, 2016). However, in
order for this boundary turbulence to occur, the user has to realize that there was a
privacy violation to begin with. This turbulence tends to manifest when the user
experiences either problems with a security breach, or sees evidence that their behavior is
being tracked.
While this theory was developed to describe privacy negotiations in interpersonal
relationships, the main principles are still applicable to online privacy since it focuses not
on the private information itself, but the management of the information. Since the
development of the theory in 1991 it has been applied in many areas including family
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communication, health information disclosures, online social networks, and blogs
(Petronio, 2013). However, the area that is most relevant to online privacy is the use of
the theory in online social networks. CPM can explain the previous example of private
information shared on a social networking site. In order to avoid confusion, the two users
will be referred to as Alice and Ben. Alice and Ben both belong to the same social
network and are friends with each other. In this situation Alice shares what is considered
private information about Ben to their group of friends online. Alice did not ask Ben if
she could share this information, yet Ben does not feel there was a privacy violation. In
this situation the rules negotiated by Alice and Ben were not violated with this disclosure.
Opponents to privacy as a form of control state that this same situation would be different
if the information was different (Levin & Abril, 2009). CPM explains this change by
saying that the rules regarding the disclosure of the information has changed. So, while
online privacy is the user having control over one’s information the amount of control
can change depending on the given situation.
When looking at online privacy through the lens of CPM the nature of the debate
changes. This exposes the underlying problem with online privacy to be one of boundary
rule violations. Boundary rule violations can occur in a wide variety of circumstances
either intentionally or unintentionally. An unintentional violation can be as simple as an
accidental slip, disclosing the information without realizing that’s what happened, but can
also occur because of some form of miscommunication between the co-owners of the
information (Petronio, 2004). If the rules were not identified explicitly in the negotiation
or not understood by either party, unintentional boundary violations are likely to result.
Boundary rule negotiations do not occur very often online when it is between a large
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organization and the end user. When these negotiations do occur it is typically in the
form of a privacy agreement that the user most likely has not read (Malaga, 2014).
However, there is no consent form when a user opens their web browser or any
discussion with larger institutions about how their information should be treated. In this
situation without boundary negotiations, many users feel that another party has acted in
behalf of them. At this time, many users believe that different activities online are
protected by law as private (Peralta, 2013). This belief may not be consistent with the
current laws and all online activities may not be treated equally. This leads to the first
research question
R1: What are the laws currently in place (if any) to protect a user’s online privacy?
Over the years, activities online have become progressively more public. Part of this is
related to online social networks and the blurring of the line between public and private
(Vitak, 2012). Not surprisingly, people have started to become aware that they have little
expectations of privacy online and are calling out for more privacy protections (Risen,
2015). Only this year (2016) was the Electronic Communications Act of 1986 revisited
(Kelly, 2016) in light of new technology, even when advocates have long stated that the
language is outdated (Sidbury, 2001). This leads us to the second research question
R2: What are the potential barriers to greater online privacy protections?
The answers to these questions still do not offer much to the user in terms of privacy
management when they are not a party to the boundary negotiations. This leads us to our
final research question
R3: What measures are available for users to have greater online privacy protection?
6

These research questions will be addressed by looking at the current privacy laws in the
United States at both a federal and state level. In addition, the rules currently governing
the institutions involved with user privacy agreements will be examined. Research
question 2 will be addressed by examining the state of technology today, online platform
business models, and potential governmental interests in the state of online privacy.
Research question 3 will be answered by detailing a list of methods that users can employ
to protect their own privacy when institutions fail to protect their privacy rights. These
methodologies include both technical and social solutions to protecting online privacy.

2. Privacy Laws Today
The United States has an interesting approach to protecting online privacy compared to
other major world powers. There is not a dedicated governing body for privacy issues
and not a single comprehensive privacy law. Instead, there are many different privacy
laws each covering a small subsection of privacy. This results in a patchwork design
where many pieces of cloth are sewed together to make a whole, but not all of the pieces
fit together perfectly and there are a few holes here and there (Soto & Simpson, 2014).
There are an estimated 14 United States laws that have measures to protect online
privacy. This list primarily covers the United States federal laws. There are numerous
state laws that strengthen online privacy protections in the United States, but currently
there is no known method of comprehensively reviewing state laws across all 50 states.
The majority of these laws were passed before the start of the 21st century and many of
them have no mention of the Internet. Instead, it is assumed that the protections provided
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to offline services extend to online as well since they were implemented to protect the
data itself. These protections should not change regardless of what form the data is in or
where it is stored. The privacy protections in these 14 laws are summarized as followed:
2.1 Summary of Privacy Laws
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
The Cable Communications Act was enacted in 1984 and applies to cable companies and
service providers. This act contains provisions regarding information security, data
collection and data access. The information covered under this law known as personal
identifiable information (PII), which is any information that can be used to identify a
particular user. The privacy protections specified in this law do not apply to aggregate
data. All cable companies and service providers must have a privacy policy that specifies
the nature in which PII is used, collected, and duration of time it is saved. The company
can only use the cable system to collection information when the information is deemed
necessary to provide services or detect the unauthorized use of services. This information
cannot be collected or disclosed without the user’s content. The company is permitted to
disclose information without the user’s consent if it is necessary to conduct business, to a
court, or if the disclosure is only a list of names and addresses. Subscriber’s do have the
right to access the information collected from them and take civil action if the law is
violated by the company.
California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003
The California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 requires that all web platforms that
engage in online data collection must conspicuously post their privacy policy on the
8

website. This law covers third parties that the web platform might share information
with. The privacy policy must state how the user can make changes to their information,
how find changes to the privacy policy, and identify the type of information that the
website collects. An amendment to the law in 2013 requires web sites to also post how
they respond to “Do Not Track” signatures or other methods consumers use to indicate
they do not wish for persistent identifiers to be used to track their online behavior.
California Security Breach Information Act
The California Security Breach Information Act requires any state, person, business, or
other agency that has computerized personal information data to disclose any security
breach that would expose unencrypted information of California residents to
unauthorized persons. Personal information data is defined as data that includes the first
and last name of the individual when combined with either their social security number,
driver’s license number, bank account number, or credit card number when the
information is not encrypted. Personal information does not include anything that is in
publically available records. Entities can provide notice of security breaches by
notification of statewide media, posting the breach on the agency’s website, email, or
written notice.
Children’s Online Privacy Act of 1998
The Children’s Online Privacy Act of 1998 (COPPA) specifies protections for children
who self-identify as being under the age of 13 regarding the collection and management
of information. This law applies to anyone operating a website used for commercial
purpose that collects and maintains personal information. This law also applies to any
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third parties and advertisers that have content on the site and know that they are
collecting information from children. Personal information includes the child’s first and
last name; home or physical address; email address; phone number; social security
number; and any other identifier that permits contact. Personal information could also
include information concerning the parents of the child when combined with one piece of
the child’s personal information. In 2013 the law was updated to include geolocation
data and persistent identifiers in the definition of personal information. These entities
must provide notice to the parents of what information is collected from the child, how
the information is used and information sharing practices. Parents must give consent for
the collection, use, and disclosure of their child’s information. The parents also have the
right to receive information regarding the type of information collected and the
information that is collected from their child. Permission for the entity to use or maintain
the information can be refused, however, the entity has the right to terminate the service
if the parents refuse to allow the information to be used.
There are a few exceptions where the parents do not have to give consent for the entity to
use the child’s information. These circumstances include when contact information is
used to respond once to a child and not used to contact them again; request for name or
online contact information is used for the purpose of contacting the parent for consent
and providing notification of collection practices; online contact information used to
respond more than once to the child regarding a specific request made by the child; name
and contact information if the safety of the child is in question; any situation where the
information is necessary to protect the security and integrity of the site. In all of these
situations the information cannot be maintained in any retrievable form.
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Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 criminalizes
unauthorized access and disclosure of information in electronic storage. Specifically, it is
illegal to gain access without authorization or exceed an authorization to access a facility
which provides electronic communication and prevent access, alter, or obtain electronic
communication while it is in storage. The law does not apply to conduct authorized by
the entity providing the electronic service or user of said service. The entity that is
providing the electronic communication service to the public should not disclose the
contents of any communication. In the case of providing remote computing services the
entity must also not disclose the contents of communication that is carried on the service.
Providers can disclose information of customers where the contents were accidently
obtained and appear to pertain to a crime or the provider can disclose information to the
government if the provider has a good faith belief that an emergency relating to the
death/injury of another person requires the use of the information. If the electronic
communication is in the system for 180 days or less the government can require
disclosure with a warrant and must give prior notice to customer. If the electronic
communication is in the system for over 180 days, the government can require disclosure
without the provider giving the customer notice. The records covered in this law can
include first and last name; address; session times and durations; length of the service and
the services used; network address; and the means or payment of services. Customer
does have the right to challenge requests for information disclosure.
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Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 criminalizes a large amount of computer
activities. Specifically the law criminalizes extorting money using computer based
threats or threats to the computer; attempting to defraud traffic using a password or
similar measure; the transmission of code or unauthorized access that damages a
computer; unauthorized access or exceeding authorized access on a computer with the
intent to fraud and receives something of value for the fraud; unauthorized access to
government or nonprofit computers; unauthorized access or exceeding authorized access
to computer and obtains financial information, information from any governmental
agency, or information from any protected computer; accessing a protected computer and
transmitting classified information to anyone but a United States government employee.
Protected computers are defined as computers used exclusively by a financial institution
or United States government agency or computers used in affecting interstate or foreign
commerce or communication.
Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996
The Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 was enacted to protect the accuracy,
fairness, and privacy of personal information assembled by credit reporting agencies.
Credit reporting agencies are responsible for the accuracy of reports and have a duty to
correct and update consumer information. The agency is prohibited from providing
information that is incorrect if the consumer has given notice that the information is
incorrect. Consumers have the right to view their credit file if there is an adverse action
against them dependent on the information in the file. The law prohibits use of credit
reports for marketing purposes and limits the use of reports to applications for credit,
12

rentals, and insurance; employment; court orders; business needs in transactions the
customer initiated; account review; professional licensing; child support payments; and
law enforcement access. If the report contains any medical information additional consent
must be obtained before the information is disclosed. Individuals can take action against
the agency if they are in violation of the law. The law also contains provisions to protect
the security and destructions of personal information.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
The Electronic Communications and Privacy Act of 1986 regulates the interception of
electronic communication. Electronic communication is protected during the
communication if there is no third party present, when the information is in transit, and
when it is later stored. This Act prohibits the use of intercepted communications in legal
proceedings without a warrant unless one or all parties consent to the recording of the
communication. Private emails are protected under this act and cannot be accessed
without the consent of the user. Emails that are in transit, in home computer storage, or
unopened in remote storage for less than 180 days require a warrant in order to be
disclosed to law enforcement agencies. If the email is opened in remote storage or
unopened and stored for more than 180 days only a subpoena is required for the
disclosure of the information.
Family Education and Rights Privacy Act
The Family Education and Rights Privacy Act details procedures regarding academic
records and the rights parents have to these records. Parents and students have the right to
view records maintained by the school. Educational institutions are required to have
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consent from parent or student (if over 18) in order to disclose academic records. In select
circumstances the institutions can disclose information without consent. Specifically,
these circumstances include to school officials with an educational interest; schools a
student is transferring to; officials for auditing purposes; entities a party to financial aid
for the student; organizations conducting research for or on the school; in instance of a
court order; when needed for emergencies relating to health and safety; and law
enforcement agencies. A school can also disclose a student’s name, address, phone
number, email address, birthday, and dates of attendance without the consent of the
student or parent. Both parents and students are required to be notified each year by the
educational institution of their rights under the Family Education and Rights Privacy Act.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 enacted requirements for financial institutions
regarding information sharing practices and safeguarding of consumer information. The
institution must share details of their information sharing practices and data safeguards to
the consumer and the consumer must be given notice of these policies when opening an
account. This notice must explain in detail how the consumer’s information is collected,
shared, used, and protected. The consumer has the right to opt-out of any information
sharing with parties not affiliated with the financial institution. However, the user cannot
opt out of the marketing of products and/or services for the financial institution or where
the information is legally required. Financial institutions are required to have a written
data security plan that includes risk analysis and one employee dedicated to managing
data security safeguards. In addition to this the institution must have a security program
developed, maintained, monitored and tested that secures information. The institution is
14

responsible for changing this plan as necessary to protect the information and are strongly
encouraged to have protections in place to protect against social engineering.
Privacy Act of 1974
The Privacy Act of 1974 establishes a code that describes how the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of personally identifiable information in government
records is managed. Government agencies are required to give public notice about their
information practices and cannot disclose any record unless they obtain written request or
prior consent of the individuals of which the information pertains. Exceptions to the
consent mandate include using the information for statistical purposes by the Census
Bureau or Bureau of Statistics; routine use by a government agency; archival purposes;
use by law enforcement; congressional investigations; or other administrative purposes.
Government agencies must have both administrative and physical security systems in
place to safeguard information and each agency must have a board in place that governs
the integrity of data. When an information request is made the agency must state the
authority under which they are asking for the information. Individuals have the right to
review their records kept by the government and any amendments made to this record.
The law only applies to records held by a government agency. Courts, executive
components, and non-governmental agencies have no rights under this act.
Privacy Protection Act of 1980
The Privacy Protection Act of 1980 applies mainly to journalists and protects individuals
in this field from having to turn over any work product and documentary materials, which
includes sources, before the information is published. The Act prevents the search of
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newsrooms specifically in order to obtain the work of journalists relating to a criminal
investigation or offense. There are a few exceptions to the search provision: if the
journalistic material is believed to stop the death or serious bodily harm of another human
being or if the issuing of a subpoena would result in the destruction or change of
documentary materials.
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978
The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 extended 4th amendment protection against
unreasonable search and seizure to bank records. The Act states that government
agencies must provide notice and give individuals or financial institutions time to raise an
objection before disclosing bank records. A financial institution is defined as any
institution with the power to issue a card (debit or credit). The government may not
obtain copies or access the information unless under one of the following circumstances:
customer consent, court subpoena or summons, warrant, judicial subpoena, or written
request from a government authority. However, if the disclosure does not identify a
particular customer, is in the interest of the financial institution, in connection to
supervisory investigations and proceedings, under tax privacy provisions, or in pursuit of
federal statues or rules, administrative or judicial proceedings, the legitimate functions of
supervisors, and in the case of an emergency related to foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence. This law does not apply to state governments, local governments, or
private businesses.
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Telecommunications Act of 1996
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides regulations for telecommunications
carriers that receives or obtains subscriber ownership information. Carriers that receive
this information from another carrier may only use the information for the purpose of
providing services. The Act explicitly prohibits using this information for marketing
purposes. If the carrier receives ownership information through providing services to a
subscriber then they can disclose, use, or permit access to the personally identifiable
customer ownership network information when they are providing services. The two
exceptions to this provision are when required by law or have the consent of the
customer. In addition to this the carrier must disclose information to the customer if
presented with a written request. However, aggregate data may be disclosed, used, or
accessed for reasons other than providing services if access is provided in a
nondiscriminatory way. The provisions in this Act do not prohibit information use for
the purposes of bill collection or telemarketing practices.
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988
The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 protects the personal identifiable rental records
of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual material. These records cannot
be disclosed unless it is to the customer or with written consent of the customer. The
customer can give consent using electronic means and can give consent for disclosure in
advance of said disclosure. Time must be provided for the customer to withdraw from
ongoing disclosure. The video provider may disclose if the information only contains the
names and addresses of customers. The video provider may also disclose to law
enforcement proving they have a warrant for the information. This Act was amended in
17

2013 to allow video providers to share information with social networking sites with the
permission of the customer.
2.12 Summary
Overall, these privacy laws are essentially split into 2 different sections with regards to
the privacy protections provided to the public: privacy & information security.
Information security is primarily concerned with the protection of the integrity,
confidentiality, and accessibility of data (Amankwa, Loock, & Kritzinger, 2015).
Keeping data confidential is part of protecting online privacy, but information security
approaches to laws leave out one very important concept; data collection. Information
security’s focus is on the protection of the data after collection and during the collection
process. This necessitates splitting the laws into two groups based on if they regulate the
data that can be collected from users.
The majority of the laws in the United States that relate to online privacy have a central
focus on information security. This area of privacy law mainly focuses on how the
information collected from users must be used, stored, and accessed. In addition to these
core areas the laws also address the disclosure of security breaches to members of the
public that are affected. These laws strongly emphasize the importance of maintaining
data confidentiality. 13 of the laws have some provision regulating the disclosure
practices of information. In general, an entity that collects and stores user data is
prohibited from disclosing that data to anyone else without the consent of the user from
which the data was collected. Each law has exceptions to this protection with the main
exception allowing law enforcement access with a subpoena or warrant. There is not one
blanket law that covers information security, instead the laws pertain only to specific
18

types of institutions or information (financial, health). The more sensitive the
information is considered to be, the stronger the privacy protections for the information.
For example, any data containing an individual’s social security number, or any financial
information has some of the strongest privacy protections. Financial institutions under
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 are required to have an information security policy
in place that is tested and changed as needed along with a dedicated employee for
safeguarding information. These provisions are most likely in place because this type of
information can be easily used to commit identity theft. Identity theft in the United States
is estimated to affect seven percent of adults and have financial loss exceeding 15 billion
dollars (Blake, 2015). Some of the laws with the focus on information security explicitly
state in the text of the law that the intent is to protect consumers against identity theft
(Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act).
Another section of the information security laws guard not against identity theft, but
against unreasonable search and seizure by the United State government. The privacy
laws today extend 4th amendment rights to bank records, video records,
telecommunication records, medical records, credit reports, unpublished journalistic
material, and wire/electronic communications (Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act; Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act; Electronic Communications
Privacy Act; Privacy Protection Act of 1980; Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978;
Telecommunications Act of 1996; & Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988). Many of
these laws have no specific mentions of the Internet or how information related to
Internet use and storage should be treated. At the time many of these laws were enacted
the personal computer had not yet reached widespread adoption, let alone the Internet. In
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1997 two-thirds of households were found to own a personal computer and on average
only had a personal computer for a little less than 2 years (Venkatesh & Brown, 2001).
This places the general widespread adoption of personal computers in the mid-1990s
which was roughly 5 years after the commercial introduction of the Internet. 9 of the 14
identified privacy laws were enacted before this time, which means there was no reason
to consider a technology like the Internet. This omission in the laws force individuals to
apply laws enacted under different circumstances to new technologies that may or may
not fit within the scope of the law despite the same need for protection.
With one notable exception, all of the laws focusing on information security are only
concerned with some form of personally identifiable information. This could coincide
with the ability to use the information to commit fraud. The one exception to this is the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act which goes beyond protecting personal
information and records to protecting the content of communication. This law is the
strongest protection that United States citizens have in terms of what can be used against
them in the court of law. However, this law does not provide nearly as much protection
to Internet users as what it appears to at first glance of the law. This breakdown of
protection occurs because of the third party provision. Electronic communications are
not protected if a third party is present during the communication. At this time the only
form of Internet communication protected under this Act is email because of this
provision. A third party is broadly defined as anyone else that can hear, or in the case of
the Internet see the communication as it is taking place. Under this definition any web
platform is considered a third party since the communication takes place using a service
where the provider of the service has the ability to “listen in” on a conversation (Trabsky,

20

Thomas, & Richardson, 2013). This provision largely leaves the Internet as public space
in terms of United States law.
There is only 1 law that qualifies as focusing on the online privacy of individuals in
regards to data collection practices which fits with the notion that the Internet is a public
space. The Child’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA) specifies data
collection practices of web services for children who self-identify as being under the age
of 13. This law was the first true online privacy law in the United States and essentially
prohibits the collection of personal information for children under 13 without the consent
of the parent (The Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998; Center for Media Education,
2001). The law was amended in 2012 and one of the major updates was significantly
changing the definition of personal information. As of 2013 persistent trackers, global
positioning information, and a video, photo, or audio file that contains a child’s likeness
or voice qualifies as personal information (Freeman & O’Neill, 2013). This law is the
only privacy law in the United States that includes these pieces of information in the
definition of personal information. As a result, many websites prohibit children under the
age of 13 from creating an account since data collection practices are highly regulated
(Boyd, Hargittai, Schultz, & Palfrey, 2011).
However, there is a very important piece of this law that weakens the privacy protections
for children that was added in the 2012 revisions. The law specifies that it only applies to
children who self-identify as being under the age of 13. There is not a requirement for
children to verify that they are over the age of 13 (The Children’s Online Privacy Act of
1998), only to check a box or enter a birth date. Today, the result of this law is a large
amount of children lying about their age in order to access the desired website (Boyd et
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al., 2011). Researchers estimate that there are millions of children with Facebook
accounts that are under the age of 13 (Boyd et al., 2011). The addition of this selfidentification clause essentially makes this law a piece of paper that is rarely enforced in
practice.
There are many different state laws that try to address the gaps in online privacy law.
However, most of the states still focus on data security and personally identifiable
information over data collection (Russom, Sloan, & Warner, 2011). A few have
expanded the definition of personally identifiable information to include information
specific to the Internet, more specifically web history. The states that have expanded the
PII definition are Minnesota, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Louisiana, and Pensylvannia
(Russom et al., 2011). The one state worth singling out is California.
At this time California has been ahead of the rest of the country, including the federal
government, in terms of online privacy protections. California passed the first major
state online privacy law, the California Online Privacy Protection Act. This legislation
was first enacted in 2004 and forced web platforms to display their privacy policies in a
place that was easily accessed and noticed by the consumer (California Online Privacy
Act; Bergman, Halpert, & Plesser, 2004). This law was amended to include provisions
for Do Not Track signatures for California residents and extended the privacy policy
requirement to include mobile applications (Donohue, 2014). Do Not Track signatures
are essentially a piece of code in a web browser that communicates to web platforms that
the user does not wish their online behavior to be tracked (Ferden, 2016; Jaeger, 2013).
The law specifically requires web operators to state their response to Do Not Track
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signatures, it does not have any provisions that require operators to honor them
(Donohue, 2014).
2.2 Organization Policies
The laws in the United States give almost no online privacy protection so the gaps in the
laws are filled by organizational policies governed by self-regulation. Many of the
privacy laws require that institutions provide notice to their customers as to their policies
on data use, collection, and sharing practices. These have typically taken shape as terms
of use agreements and privacy policies that vary based on the organization or institution.
However, there are not very many laws that govern the use of privacy policies for the
majority of online web platforms. The only law that applies to all web platforms is the
California Online Privacy Protection Act, which only applies to California residents.
Outside of California there is no set requirement that a web platform must have a privacy
policy posted unless it falls under one of the regulated industries in the privacy laws put
in place before the Internet. Researchers have determined that only 14% of companies
that collect user information have a posted privacy policy (Chen & Michael, 2012).
Instead of government regulation the Federal Trade Commission advocates for industry
self-regulation (Papacharissi & Fernback, 2005). This translates to the web platform
having the freedom to include any conditions they want within their privacy policy and
require users to agree to these terms before using the web platform.
Web companies are under no obligation to actually protect the privacy of their users
through the use of a privacy statement (Papacharissi & Fernback, 2005). Instead the
burden is placed on the user to read the posted privacy statement and decide for
themselves if they agree to the terms in the privacy policy. This burden has been deemed
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unfair by some researchers since privacy policies are written in dense legal language
designed to protect web platforms from privacy lawsuits instead of actually informing the
user of policies of which they are most concerned (Papacharissi & Fernback, 2005;
Pollach, 2007). Even if the privacy policy contained information that the user wanted to
know the chance of them being able to comprehend the policy is fairly slim. Research
studies that have examined privacy policies for their readability have found that these
policies are written above a 12th grade reading level with some requiring as much as 2
years of college to fully comprehend (Graber, D’Alessandro, & Johnson-West, 2002;
Lewis, Colvard, & Adams, 2008). This is problematic since the Literacy Foundation
estimates that up to 50% of adults in the United States cannot read above an eighth grade
level (Literacy Project Foundation, 2007).
Compounded with the problems of readability and information included in the statement
is the actual length of a privacy policy. Privacy policies can be as short as a paragraph or
as long as 15 pages. The amount of time needed to read all of the privacy policies a user
would come in contact with in a year amounts to 181 hours per year, assuming that the
privacy policies are short. If the privacy policies come closer to the long end of the
spectrum an individual is going to spend about 304 hours each year just reading privacy
policies (McDonald & Cranor, 2009). This might explain why so many people just skip
over the privacy policy altogether. In a small-scale study researchers found that out of
200 users only 7 clicked the privacy policy before signing up for a particular service
(Malaga, 2014). On a much larger scale researchers conducted eye-tracking studies to
examine how users read privacy policies. The results of the study indicated that when
there is an option to agree to the policy without reading it most users will skip reading the
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policy (Steinfeld, 2016). Privacy policies are an inadequate way of informing users on
the data collection practices of a web platform and do nothing to actually protect the
user’s privacy.
2.3 Recommendations
At this time the United States approach to online privacy protections is a failure. Legal
experts have applied the term “patchwork quilt” to describe the privacy laws in the
United States (Diorio, 2015; Soto & Simpson, 2014), but there isn’t enough material to
construct anything resembling a quilt. The United States one of the only countries with
no blanket online privacy laws and also has no regulating body dedicated to data
protection (Soto & Simpson, 2014). For the most part the United States has relied on
self-regulatory practices for online privacy protection, but organizations have no
incentive to protect users’ online privacy since personal data is considered a commodity
(Hirsch, 2011). In order to negotiate this clash of interests there are different regulatory
frameworks the United States could adopt in order to offer greater online privacy
protections.
Legal experts in the United States have set forth a structure of four factors for courts to
consider when accessing online privacy cases. However, the recommendations are
directly related to regulatory practices go back to the self-regulation model using terms of
use agreements. The first recommendation is that all entities which engage is
communication monitoring or data collection practices online should be required to
provide a policy that outlines the specifics of these practices (Haynes, 2012). The theory
behind this is that users should be able to find a different service if they do not agree with
the statement. This fails to take into consideration that many users are required by
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different circumstances to use specific online services. These people would still not have
a choice. The second recommendation is that if the user is not provided notice of the
privacy policy then they should not be bound by it (Haynes, 2012). This
recommendation has some merit, since many online platforms if they provide notification
(e.g. Google, Twitter, LinkedIn) only notify the users of significant policy changes. The
platform is the one that decides what is “significant” (Google, 2016; LinkedIn, 2014; &
Twitter, 2016). However, many users are still left with little action after they agree to a
particular policy since holding platforms accountable to their policies can prove difficult
(Diorio, 2015). An example of this is the Facebook Mood Manipulation study that was
conducted in 2012. Roughly 689,000 Facebook users’ newsfeeds were manipulated to
highlight either more depressing or more positive content in order to study the user’s
mood change in statuses (Meyer, 2014). However, at the time that the experiment was
conducted Facebook’s privacy policy contained no mention of a consent to research.
This stipulation was only added 4 months after the conclusion of the experiment (Hill,
2014). When the study was published this news came to light and while the actions of
Facebook were deemed to be highly unethical, there was no punishment other than a
public relations nightmare. There needs to be a regulatory body that holds web
companies accountable to their terms of use agreements and keeps an archive of all
versions of a company’s terms of use agreement. For this reason, a hybrid approach to
privacy regulation is more suitable than one that is pure self-regulation.
A hybrid approach uses a mixture of industry self-regulation and government regulation
to protect online privacy. Part of this regulation is modeled after the European Union’s
approach to online privacy. The European Union (EU) has codified a right to privacy and
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the data of an individual cannot be handled without permission (Diorio, 2015). There are
of course exceptions to this stipulation out of necessity. Instead of the inadequate quilt
model of the United States, the EU has universal data privacy laws with one regulatory
body overseeing them. This particular approach would simplify the situation in the
United States. Currently, the strictest online privacy laws only apply to one state.
However, distinguishing between web traffic based on state could be tricky, especially
when there are several technologies that can alter Internet Protocol addresses and block
geolocation (e.g. TunnelBear, The Onion Router). This would also clarify definitions
related to online privacy, such as Do Not Track. At this point in time there is no federal
standard for Do Not Track technologies and it is not clearly defined in the California law
either (Donohue, 2014).
Individual companies that operate online platforms could still have the ability to set their
own terms and conditions, but regulation could help protect individuals from abuse of
these documents. One of the ways that privacy policies could be changed is to make
certain aspects of data collection and data sharing practices optional. When individuals
are given the ability to opt in to certain practices instead of opting out of them by default
they are more likely to read the given terms and conditions (Steinfeld, 2016). This would
promote transparency and also serve to educate the public about who has access to the
data they generate.
The United States has attempted to reform online privacy regulation in the past. In 2012
the Federal Trade Commission released an online privacy report urging for regulation
changes to protect the privacy of consumers. The report details a plan for regulation that
includes sections on Do Not Track, data broker industry transparency and enforceable
27

self-regulation (Federal Trade Commission, 2012). The FTC encouraged limitations on
data collection and reform of privacy policies that would make them shorter and easier
for the average user to understand (Federal Trade Commission, 2012). Many of these
recommendations are not out of line with what was proposed earlier. This report drew the
attention of industry leaders as well as members of Congress who began to deliberate on
sweeping privacy protections (Desai, Drobac, Gates, & Louer, 2012). Around the same
time of the FTC report, the White House proposed a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights that
was based on similar principles: transparency, individual control, respect for context,
security, access and accuracy, focused collection, and accountability (The White House,
2012). However, this proposed legislation, like many others, never passed. Privacy
reform in the United States moves at a glacial pace (Singer, 2016).

3.0 Barriers to Greater Privacy Protections
While the Washington gridlock could partly be blamed for the lack of movement for
greater online privacy protections, the issue is far more complex. There are several issues
at the heart of impeding privacy protection including industry business models; interests
in innovation and research; and motives of law enforcement.
3.1 Industry Objections
The industry’s response to greater online privacy protections is not uniform. In many
cases companies will state that they are in favor of greater privacy protections for
consumers, but are very specific in the type of protection of which they would be in
favor. The information technology industry tends to lean favorably toward greater
privacy protections that extend 4th amendment protections. A good example of this is the
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recent proposal for revising the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. This piece of
legislation is largely considered outdated by privacy advocates since it has draconian
provisions for email protection against search and seizure (Lofgren, 2014). When a
revision of this Act was proposed in 2015 the Computing Technology Industry
Association (CompTIA) came out in favor of this legislation (CompTIA, 2015).
CompTIA is one of the major lobbying groups for the technical industry and has around
2000 member companies (CompTIA, 2015). However, the industry response changes
when proposed regulation is attempting to change the current self-regulation structure in
the United States. They frequently state that their objection is due the regulation’s
likelihood of curbing innovation and research in information technology (Federal Trade
Commission, 2012). While this objection is not without merit, there is a greater reason
behind their negative position; money.
Currently companies that operate web platforms offer most of their services with no
monetary cost for the user. In order to survive, these companies use a similar model to
other media industries and depend on advertising revenue. User privacy typically takes a
hit since the web platforms collect large amounts of data and then sell that data to
advertisers to help them better target their users (Sevignani, 2013). Platforms that collect
large amounts of diverse data, like Google and Facebook, are highly attractive to
advertisers. Stricter privacy regulations are not favorable for these companies since it
would harm their business model. Advertisers were uncomfortable with Google even
discussing discontinuing the use of cookies to collect user information (Vranica &
Stewart, 2013). After the implementation of stricter privacy laws in the European Union
the effectiveness of targeted online advertising diminished. If the same effect would to

29

be observed in the United States researches estimated that advertisers would have to
spend 14.8 billion dollars more in order to reach the same level of advertising
effectiveness (Goldfarb & Tucker, 2011). This would seriously devalue online
advertising in the United States.
The industry’s claim that greater privacy regulation would also harm innovation and
research is also a valid point. Online surveillance has helped usher in the era of Big Data
which has completely changed some areas of research. Big Data has been defined as
large, longitudinal, diverse and complex data sets that can be generated from almost any
instrument including click streams, social media, and nearly any digital source (White &
Breckenridge, 2014). Today the use of Big Data methodology has increased and is used
in a wide variety of fields including medicine, criminology, communication, psychology
and education. Instead of researching by taking a sample of a population these data sets
come very close to an actual population size which makes it easier to yield statistically
significant results (Chan & Bennett, 2016; McCormick, Ferrell, Karr, & Ryan, 2014).
This allows for the continued advancement in many fields. Online privacy regulation
factors in because many institutions conducting research using Big Data do not
necessarily collect their own data. They instead depend on data collected from
companies like Facebook and Google (White & Breckenridge, 2014). If these companies
were restricted in the amount of information they could collect, it could end up harming
research based on Big Data analytics.
3.2 Law Enforcement Objections
The only voice that drowns out the industry’s objections is law enforcement. Law
enforcement are against virtually any increase in online privacy protections. Greater
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privacy protections are in direct conflict with their job since currently the majority of
online information has absolutely no 4th amendment protection. This makes it much
easier to gain information necessary for criminal investigations, prosecution, and in some
areas prevention. Law enforcement is even against greater privacy protections that do not
directly regulate them which includes any protection that would limit data collection and
enhance data security. This reasoning behind this objection goes back government
surveillance practices under the Patriot Act.
The Patriot Act is a massive piece of legislation with 1041 sections that was passed
shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The main purpose of this Act was
to give the government all the power necessary in order to combat the threat of terrorism.
The Patriot Act greatly expanded the legality of surveillance programs in the United
States and was one of the first pieces of legislation to greatly expand that power (USA
PATRIOT Act, 2001). In 2008 the government’s power was further expanded and this
expansion is responsible for the birth of the PRISM program (Ahn, 2014). This program
remained secret up until 2013 when Edward Snowden leaked classified National Security
Agency (NSA) documents to The Guardian (Toxen, 2014). These documents revealed
that the PRISM program allowed the NSA to collect massive amounts of user
information including video, pictures, audio, emails, documents, and connection logs
directly from major technical companies (Gray & Citron, 2013). The NSA collected
from data from some of the largest Internet platforms including Google, Facebook,
YouTube, and Yahoo (Florek, 2014). The fact that these companies were already
receiving and collecting massive amounts of information made collection for the NSA
much easier. If these companies did not collect as much information, or the information
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was more secure the program could have been more difficult to execute. Both law
enforcement and the information technology industry work together to lobby against
greater online privacy protection through the form of regulation. Congress is still hesitant
to enact greater privacy protections through regulation. Many of the entities that have
weighed in on the regulation discussion have proposed an alternative to protecting the
online privacy of users by shifting the burden of protection on to the users themselves.

4.0 Privacy Enhancing Technologies
The Federal Trade Commission in their 2012 report on privacy advocated for greater
privacy protections in the form of regulation, but also advocated for users to utilize
privacy enhancing technologies such as encryption. There are several techniques
available to users today that can help them take charge of their own online privacy
instead of waiting for regulation that may never happen. These techniques vary in the
amount of skill and technology required to use them. Some privacy enhancing
techniques rely less on technology, but more on changing habits online. There are a
variety of techniques available for users to protect their own privacy online, but which
technique they decide to use will be dependent on the type of privacy protection they
desire. None of these techniques have the power to extend 4th amendment rights to
online information, only the law has that power. In general, these techniques work in one
of two ways: preventing data collection or changing the content of the information in a
way that makes it useless to the collector thus it is important to understand how
information can be collected. There are three easily distinguishable ways that information
can be collected online. The first method of data collect most Americans are aware of at
this point and that is voluntary disclosure. Anything that is willingly put online is
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typically collected by someone. There are two other methods of collecting data that users
need to be aware of in order to choose techniques to protect their privacy: cookies, web
bugs.
4.1 Data Collection Methods
Cookies are small pieces of text that are stored on a user’s browser that are used to
identify that browser if they should visit the site again (Yue, Xie, & Wang, 2007). Over
time there have been many different developments in cookies that vary on use and
longevity. Some cookies are very useful, such as the ones used for transaction oriented
data, vanish as soon as the web browser is closed (session cookies), those that can store
passwords so they don’t have to be memorized as well as those that personalize a user’s
web experience (Yue, Xie, & Wang, 2007). Cookies can also be seen as a violation of
privacy since this technology can also enable the tracking of users across multiple sites
and by using the site the user could be implicitly agreeing to the use of cookies (Berghel,
2013). The use of tracking cookies by advertisers is fairly widespread at this point.
Researchers found that there is more than a 99.5% chance that if a user visited 30 results
of a search engine inquiry they would be subjected to the tracking of at least 10 different
cookies (Gomer, Rodriegues, Milic-Frayling, & Schraefel, 2013). The good news is
cookies can easily be deleted by the user on a fairly regular basis and their use is fairly
well known (Goldfarb & Tucker, 2011).
This brings up the next method of data collection which is web bugs. Web bugs are small
pieces of code embedded in a website that are invisible to users (unless one decides to
examine the code itself) (Goldfarb & Tucker, 2011). This code works in conjunction with
cookies to track a user’s habits as they travel from site to site. Essentially the purpose of a
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web bug is to track the user’s web navigation (Fonesca, Pinto, & Meira, 2005). Web
bugs pose a new challenge to privacy since they are invisible to the user and are not
stored on the user’s computer at all (Goldfarb & Tucker, 2011). Most users are probably
not aware that these pieces of code exist at all, which makes it very difficult to fight
against them.
4.2 Types of Data
In addition to there being multiple methods of collecting data online, there are multiple
types of data that can be collected and are they not treated equally by privacy enhancing
technology. There are roughly five types of data which are mainly collected by
commercial entities: user content, meta data, web navigation, search, and clickstream
data. User content is the type of data that most people will first think of. This type of
data encompasses anything a user would post online including videos, audio chats,
pictures, social media posts, and emails. Meta data is essentially data that describes the
user’s post itself, not the content in the post. This can cover many pieces of information
such as Internet Protocol address, geolocation data, name, time stamp, etc. Web
navigation and search are types of data that are fairly self-explanatory. Web navigation is
a user’s movements from website to website, so essentially a browsing history that
includes every link clicked as well as that typed in. Search data is anything typed in to a
search engine. Clickstream data is slightly more complex. When a user is interacting
with a website every click they make on the page is considered to be clickstream data
along with how they arrived to that page, and how long they spent on it (Goldfarb &
Tucker, 2011).
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Each of the privacy enhancing technologies will be analyzed according to what type of
protection they provide, the type of information they protect, and the ease at which the
user can pick up the technology. There are five broad categories of technology that seek
to provide greater privacy protection for users: Tracker blockers, private browsers,
encryption technology, self-destruct tools, and anonymity technology.
4.3 Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Tracker Blockers
This technology is based on a tool developed in 2005 to detect Web Bugs. A Web Bug
detector intercepts a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) requests from both the user and
the website in question and analyzes those requests. By comparing the user request with
the response from the website the technology is able to detect the presence of any Web
Bugs. This detector was designed to make users aware of these invisible privacy
invaders and turns red when a Web Bug has been found (Fonseca et al., 2005). Tracker
blockers go a step further by not only detecting Web Bugs, but also eliminating them.
The elimination is accomplished by not showing the content that contains the Web Bug.
In addition to finding and eliminating Web Bugs, tracker blockers also locate and block
cookies that exist for the sole purpose of tracking user behavior (Chen & Singer, 2016).
Tracker blockers work by protecting the user against data collection, it does not eliminate
the data itself, which means if the trackers ever surpass the technology blocking them
then the user’s privacy is in jeopardy. This technology mainly protects navigation data
and offers little to no protection outside of that ability. Most of the tracker blockers on
the market today are available for free and come in the form of a browser extension
which can be installed with just a few clicks. Very few of the individual technologies
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fully explain how they work, but this might be to limit the technical jargon in the
extension. At this point there are lots of tracker blockers on the market but there are three
that have risen above the rest of the market: Ghostery, Disconnect, and Privacy Badger.
Each of these specific technology offers a different approach to privacy.
Ghostery is by far the most popular tracker blocker at this point with over 40 million
downloads and is an extension available for Chrome, FireFox, Safari, Internet Explorer
and Opera. Ghostery maintains a database of web trackers totaling to over 2000 trackers
(Ghostry). This extension takes some time to set up since by default it blocks absolutely
no web trackers. For those highly concerned with privacy it may not be the best tool to
use since it actually collects data from its users in order to help maintain its database.
While this feature is available in the form of “opt-in”, it is a little concerning to see user
data collection from a privacy enhancing technology. Following the screen that requests

Figure 1. Ghostery sign up screen
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the user to opt-in to tracking is a screen requesting the user to create an account, consent
to data sharing practices, and consent to their privacy statement which can only be
reached by following another link (see Figure 1).
Once all the hoops are jumped the extension is not that difficult to use, but requires the
user to essentially customize the blocking procedures for every single site (Ghostry).
Developers stated that this was done by choice since blocking some trackers can
essentially break a site (Chen & Singer, 2016). This could potentially be very exhausting
for those that use the Internet on a fairly regular basis. The biggest hurdle to get over
with Ghostery is that it is a privacy enhancing technology that engages in the same
practices as the industry does by collecting data from its users and requesting user
information up front. Some of the reviews of the new release in March 2016 also accuse
the site of some shady business practices which include deleting most of the negative
reviews on their product (Mele20, 2016). Disconnect is another tracker blocker that is a
fairly popular choice for web users, but it goes a step further in terms of protection
compared with Ghostery. Disconnect offers three versions of its main technology. The
two more advanced versions of Disconnect are available for a fee, but also double as
malware protection so there is more there than just a tracker blocker. This analysis will
focus on the basic version which is available to users at no charge. Disconnect has an
easy to understand interface (see figure 2) with a useful tutorial at the beginning. Unlike
Ghostery, this extension comes with some trackers blocked by default and collects
absolutely no user data. Instead of maintaining a database of known trackers Disconnect
keeps track of how many requests are made to the browser and automatically blocks
everything from advertisers, analytics, and social media. The only tracker that is kept on
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by default are those that relate directly to the content of the site. If the same tracker
makes multiple requests, it will count each of those requests separately on the counter.
One of the interesting features of Disconnect is that it allows the user to see all of the
bandwidth and time saved by blocking the tracking requests, but there is no information
on how either of those numbers is calculated (Disconnect).
Figure 2. Disconnect Interface

Privacy Badger is the third tracker blocker and takes a very different approach compared
to the other two blockers. Privacy Badger was developed by the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, one of the biggest privacy groups in the United States. The goal of Privacy
Badger is not to block every tracker on a web page, but instead to enforce a Do Not Track
signature. Remember, Do Not Track signatures are identifiers in a web browser that
signal to other sites that the user does not wish to be tracked (Ferden, 2016). The way
Privacy Badger operates makes it a far more sophisticated tool than the other two, but
possibly more difficult to use as well. Privacy Badger requires no setup when the
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browser extension is installed and it blocks absolutely nothing at that point. After
enabling the browser’s Do Not Track signature, Privacy Badger identifies all potential
trackers on a web site, but it does not block any of them unless it actually sees them track
the user. The way this works is that Privacy Badger maintains a list of potential trackers
from one site and if the same potential trackers appear across multiple sites they are
flagged as trackers and blocked (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2015). Any site that has
language written in to their policies stating that they will honor Do Not Track signatures
will not be blocked, which leads to some confusion with users (Broida, 2014; Chen &
Singer, 2016). Privacy Badger learns what to block over time and becomes more useful
the longer it is used, which is something that is not seen in either of the other two tracker
blockers.
Privacy Badger’s design is more complex and difficult to understand than the other two
tracker blockers. Each potential tracker has a slide bar next it that changes from green, to
yellow, to red, depending on the status of the tracker (see figure 3). If the bar is green the
domain is allowed, if it is yellow the domain has been identified as tracking the user but it
is necessary for some type of content on the page, and red signals that the tracker has
been blocked. Instead of giving the names of the sites responsible for the trackers like
Disconnect and Ghosterly, Privacy Badger gives the exact Uniform Resource Locator
(URL). This could make it harder to users to understand the nature of the interface if
they do not automatically know what companies the URLs are associated with. In
addition to the confusing slider configuration there is a separate section of the extension
that identifies sites that “do not appear to be tracking you” which are always allowed.
However, no further explanation is given regarding sites that fit in that category
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anywhere in Privacy Badger’s information or frequently asked question section
(Electronic Frontier Foundation).
Figure 3. Privacy Badger interface

Private Browsing
Private browsing is possibly the simplest technique that someone can use to protect their
online privacy. Private browsing protects the user’s identity from other websites and
ensures that no data from the session is stored on the user’s hard drive. The information
is still recorded during the session, but deleted after the private browsing window is
closed (Ohana & Shashidhar, 2013; Zhao & Liu, 2015). Many popular web browsers
have some form of private browsing option at this time with the most notable browsers
being Chrome, Firefox, and Safari. Private browsing generally protects privacy in two
ways, by preventing some collection of data, but also removing the data itself. Generally
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private browsing can protect a user’s web navigation and search data. The protection
does not necessarily extend to the other 3 types of data because the collection mechanism
could include the website itself and not just third party cookies and bugs. While private
browsing is one of the easiest ways to protect online privacy, it is not guaranteed to work
in all circumstances. Researchers have found that the use of web extensions in a private
browser can compromise the security in the private browser (Zhao & Liu, 2015). Users
who choose to utilize private browsing as their main form of privacy protection should
refrain from using extensions at the same time, which means that private browsing cannot
be used in conjunction with tracker blockers.
Encryption
Encryption technology is one of the strongest privacy enhancing technologies to date.
Encryption methods use a mathematical algorithm to encode the data, with the result
being unreadable unless the ciphertext is decrypted using a key (Saitta, 2015). Privacy
enhancing technologies that use encryption are the strongest methods available for
protecting information. This strength is necessary since encryption based methods are
used for more than just protecting privacy, but also for securing highly sensitive
information. In the privacy laws that cover financial information and data security there
are provisions that require the use of encryption for certain information (Privacy Act of
1974). This is because encryption is very difficult to break for all parties that do not
possess the key (Spafford, 2016). Encryption technologies are the only technologies that
cross over into granting some protection from law enforcement. In order to access the
information authorities typically have to possess the key and the courts have found that
an individual cannot be compelled to surrender encryption keys because it violates the 5th
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amendment right against self-incrimination (Atwood, 2015). The available privacy
enhancing tools that use encryption protect user content and not necessarily any other
form of data. The most common technologies are emailing and messaging systems. After
the Snowden leaks many email messaging systems started to pop up that claimed they
were immune to NSA spying. These systems all have a few commonalities, mainly they
offer end to end encryption with servers located outside of the United States, for free. The
two most vetted free encrypted email services are Tutanota and ProtonMail.
Tutanota
Tutanota launched its testing phase in 2011 with the service opening its doors to everyone
in 2014 (Infosecurity, 2014). The email service is based in Germany and offers end to
end encryption with a gigabyte of storage (Prabhu, 2016). No one at the company has
access to any of the user’s data because of how the encryption keys are stored. The
downside to this level of security is that there is no password reset button or help if a user
is locked out of their email. All data associated with the email including subject lines and
attachments are also encrypted. A user that receives an email from a Tutanota address
has two options for reading the contents. If the user receiving the email also has a
Tutanota address, then the user can decrypt the email by logging into their account.
However, if email is sent to a non-Tutanota address instructions on how to decrypt the
message must be sent through a different channel such as text messaging (Infosecurity,
2014). The email system is fairly straight forward and the signup process is very easy.
The hardest parts of using this particular service is the necessity of remembering the
password entered when creating the account and sending encrypted email to those not
using Tutanota.
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ProtonMail
ProtonMail is a Switzerland based encrypted email service that was launched in May
2014 and was exclusively an invite-only service for two years. The service was
developed by scientists from the European Organization for Nuclear Research following
the Snowden revelations. The service just ended its beta trial in 2016 and started open
registration in March of 2016 (Martin, 2016). This service adds another layer of security
to the Tutanota design by requiring two separate passwords in order to access email. The
first password authenticates the user to the server and a second password is required to
decrypt the email once logged on. Like Tutanota, none of the password information is
stored on the server, so if a user forgets their password there is no recovery system
(Grauer, 2015). Switzerland’s data privacy laws are some of the strictest today, and their
claim of protecting their users’ privacy has already been tested by the United Kingdom.
ProtonMail can only turn over information if they receive the order from a Swiss court
approved by a judge, and even then it can only hand over the information in its encrypted
form. This is exactly what happened when law enforcement agents reached out to
ProtonMail earlier in 2016, they simply do not have the ability to decrypt the information
which makes them out of the reach of law enforcement at this time (Theilman, 2015).
Overall the service is more clunky than Tutanota and requires more effort on the part of
the user because of the two password verification system. The service is fairly slow and
still has the same problems with sending external emails. Unless a user has the need to
greater security, Tutanota would be the easier of the two systems to use.
In addition to encrypted email providers there are also a few instant messengers available
that use encryption to keep communication secure between two people. At this time
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encrypted instant messengers are fairly new, so there are not many out that are highly
user friendly. The most well-known encrypted instant message systems at this time is
Off the Record (OTR) Messaging.
OTR Messaging
OTR Messaging is actually a plug-in that can be used with other instant messaging
services which makes it one of the most versatile tools available. OTR uses symmetric
encryption, which only requires one key for decrypting messages. To solve the keysharing problem that occurs with symmetric encryption the plug-in uses a modified
version of the Diffie-Hellman exchange protocol which was initially developed in 1976.
The Diffie-Hellman protocol is not the most secure way to exchange keys as it is
vulnerable to replay and man-in-the-middle attacks (Li, 2010). However, the message
must be targeted in order to use either of those attacks, which is not likely in most
circumstances with an instant messaging system. OTR was specifically designed to be
easy to use since poor usability is one of the main reasons strong privacy enhancing
technologies have poor adoption (Stedman, Yoshida, & Goldberg, 2008). This plugin is
activated using a button in an instant message client (currently the only one supported is
Pidgin) and communicates to the user the status of the conversation in regards to privacy.
There are possible statuses of a chat: not private, unverified, private, and finished. If the
chat is not private that means that the other user has not enabled OTR. If the chat is
unverified then the other user has not been authenticated, so the user may be talking to
someone that is not on their buddy list. A private chat is exactly that-private. A chat is
marked finished when one or both of the users closes the chat window (Stedman et al.,
2008). There are a couple of methods that can be used for authentication, either the users
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share a secret with each other, or use a fingerprint. The shared secret is a piece of
information that both users know, but few others would know (Stedman et al., 2008). An
example of this would be using either the date, time, or location of their last in person
meeting. If the answers match, then the chat is authenticated.
Currently there are a few messaging systems directly supported by OTR, but one of the
easiest to configure is Pidgin. Pidgin is an instant messaging client that allows the user to
sign in to all supported instant messaging accounts from one place (e.g. Yahoo!, AIM,
XMPP). In order to use Pidgin the user must have an instant messaging account already
Figure 4. Off The Record plug-in button in Pidgin

from some other provider. To use the OTR plug-in the user must first download it from
the OTR site since it is not built in to Pidgin and then once installed enable the plug-in for
use. Once OTR has been enabled it is fairly easy to use. To start OTR within a chat the
user would click the small button at the bottom of the window (see Figure 4).
From there a small drop down menu would appear with options to start a private chat. If
both members of the conversation already have private chat enabled, then there will be an
option to authenticate the user (see Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Off The Record plug-in drop down menu

The authentication option brings up a screen that is easy to navigate and gives option as
to how the user wants to authenticate their “buddy”. Once the authentication is complete
the users are free to engage in a chat protected by encryption. The hardest part of this
plug-in is knowing where to find it and install it. The rest of the information is readily
available if the user has questions when attempting to use the plug-in for the first time.
Self-Destructing Emails/Messages
Self-destruct is a type of privacy enhancing technology ensures that information is
completely deleted with no traces after either an expiration time or after the recipient
reads the message. When an email is deleted, it still remains in the system of the email
provider, even if the message has been deleted by all recipients of the message (Fu et al.,
2014). The same can be said for any electronic communication. All records are kept by
the provider unless it is stated otherwise in the terms and conditions. An email or
message can self-destruct by becoming completely unreadable (Fu et al., 2014). This
self-destruct mechanism can be accomplished in many ways and there have been
numerous protocols proposed for self-destructing data (Fu et al., 2014; Yue, Wang, &
Liu, 2010; Zing, Shi, Xu, & Feng, 2010). As such, there are multiple privacy enhancing
tools that use self-destruct technology. Because self-destructing technology is so
common, it is difficult to identify which tools are the best for an individual to use. The
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majority of tools freely accessible to users do not identify how their messages selfdestruct or provide documentation showing that it works. To better illustrate how selfdestructing tools function 2 tools were selected based on their differences in uses: Dmail,
and Privnote.
Dmail
Dmail is a browser extension that gives the user the ability to revoke access to emails sent
through their Gmail account. When the user installs the Dmail extension each new
message has a new option called “Destroy” that appears in the lower right hand corner of
the new message (see Figure 6). From there the user can choose when they want the
message to self-destruct (never, 1 hour, 1 day, or 1 week).
Figure 6. Dmail function within Gmail
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Privnote
Privnote is another self-destructing technology that is specific to messages. Privnote is a
bit more versatile than what Dmail and other self-destructing emails tools because it
concentrates only on the text the user wants to self-destruct. In order for a user to send a
self-destructing message using Privnote they would enter their message in a simple online
form and click “create message” (see Figure 7). After creating the message, the user will
be given a link that they can share with who they want and however they want. When the
link is clicked it will display the chosen message and the message will no longer be
accessible after the window is closed.
Figure 7. Privnote online form

4.31 Anonymity technology
In addition to the privacy enhancing technologies discussed previously in this section,
users also have the option to adopt an anonymity technology in order to protect their
online privacy. Anonymity technology focuses on making sure that the user’s identity
remains unknown by ensuring that the data associated with the online activities cannot be
linked back to the user in any way (e.g. IP address, name, geolocation) (Winkler &
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Zeadally, 2015). This definition goes a step further than how many social science
researchers view anonymity by discussing the data along with how other users would
view the individual using the tool (Morio & Buchholz, 2009). Unlike the other privacy
enhancing technologies, an anonymity technology does not protect the user against data
collection, or ensure that the content or data is unreadable to anyone that collects it.
Because of this major difference, experts have debated if this technology truly protects a
user’s privacy. If any entity was able to deanonymize the data, then the user’s privacy is
immediately compromised (Shmatikov, 2011). However, since anonymity as a means of
privacy is becoming a more common approach to managing online privacy there is one
selection of tools worth mentioning: The Tor Project. The Tor Project provides many
different anonymity technologies and is included in this work because its high level of
security and user base makes it less likely that its traffic would be deanonymized if it was
used correctly (Hoang & Pishva, 2014; Ruiz-Martinez, 2012).
Tor
Tor is an anonymity technology that is based on onion routing. Onion routing is a
method of routing message packets that uses layers of encryption. The message is routed
through a series of nodes before it reaches the intended recipient. The path that the
message takes to the recipient is encrypted where each node only knows the next point in
the path (Hoang & Pishva, 2014). This severs the link between the sender of the message
and the message itself. Tor currently has multiple technologies that are based on this
technology, but the two more pertinent to privacy are the Tor browser and Tor
messenger. The Tor browser can be downloaded for free and operates like a typical web
browser. When a user first opens the browser it assigns them a different IP address from
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their own, and then using onion routing for all traffic. Any information that might be
collected during that browsing session (including user content) will not be able to be
linked back to the user. The exception to this is if the user gives away any information
during their communication with others that could be traced back to them (e.g. email
address). This protection is offered in the default setting, however, if the user wants more
security they have the option to change the settings. To do this they would click on the
onion icon in the top left hand corner of the browser and click on privacy and security
settings (see Figure 8).
Figure 8. TOR browser menu

This will bring up a menu of security options. If the highest level of security is selected,
the browser will also function as a tracker blocker as well as an anonymity technology
(see Figure 9).
Tor messenger is relatively new to the Tor family and gives the ability for users to chat
anonymously, but also encrypts the contents of the chat which makes it both a privacy
enhancing technology by the strict definition as well as an anonymity technology. The
client essentially takes the OTR encryption protocol and then routes all of the information
over Tor (Greenberg, 2015). Other than that, it operates exactly as the OTR messaging
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system does for now. At this time the Tor messenger service is still in beta, so how this
format changes over time remains to be seen (sukhbir, 2015).

Figure 9. TOR privacy and security setting levels

5.0 Discussion
When examining the state of online privacy today in the United States there are a few
commonalities between the protections provided legally and through technology. The
main commonality is that both legally and technically there is almost no protections
against data collection. The closest protection against data collection offered in the
privacy enhancing technology are the tracker blockers. However, from a technology
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standpoint this is understandable since it is difficult to safeguard data against collection
when the Internet is a very public place. This is an area where the law is expected to step
in, but that is not likely to happen given that both the government and industry have a
vested interest in keeping data collection alive and unregulated. Imposing data collection
regulations in the United States could have a much greater impact than in any other
nation since the majority of Internet companies are located in the United States. While
many of these have expanded internationally at this point, the United States is the major
powerhouse in terms of Internet innovation and startups. Since so many industries have a
dependence on the current data collection practices it could be causing a chilling effect on
any developments in law or technology.
Data security is also an area that is far more advanced in both legal protections and
technological protections. This area has a history of a strong government interest since
data security is necessary for classified operations. Because of this dependence more
time, energy, and money has been spent into developing protections in this area. A good
example of this in practice is encryption. Encryption is the basis of the strongest privacy
enhancing technologies but it also happens to be at the heart of making many online
activities secure. At this point in time encryption is used for every online financial
transaction, user authentication, and in most email communication. Because this
technology is necessary for every day security it is constantly being improved. Those
improvements in turn benefit online privacy because developers can use the same
methods for privacy technologies.
Protecting online privacy in the United States will remain one of the most difficult tasks
to manage given the barriers against greater regulation complexity of the issue. This will
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become more difficult to manage as the line between online and offline becomes less
distinct. At this point in time more devices are by default connected to either the Internet
or a mobile network including televisions, fitness trackers, and other smart technology. If
the law continues to update at a glacial pace compared to the development of new
technology, then soon most of the current privacy protections will no longer be
applicable. If technology keeps developing at this pace, then users will be left to manage
their own privacy using technology or other means.
5.1 Limitations & Future Research
This research was very focused in that it concentrated the United States and Internet
accessed through desktop computers. This focus left out online privacy on an
international scale, mobile technology, and other devices that connect to the Internet.
Each of these areas have unique privacy concerns that are worth addressing. Online
privacy on an international scale is difficult to discuss since each country approaches
privacy differently according to the nature of culture and governmental structure.
However, since the Internet very rarely discriminates between nations it is becoming
increasingly important to discuss online privacy on an international level. Specifically,
there is a lot of room for research on how privacy disputes are handled across
international borders and the potential impact of international privacy standards.
Mobile technology in particular is one of the larger areas that needs to be addressed in
future research. This area was left out of the current research due to how fundamentally
different the privacy protections are from desktop Internet access. Currently mobile
technologies rely on apps for many of the customizable functions. These apps are still
highly controlled by the major players in the mobile industry with little room for third
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party development and adoption. This is a completely different playing field from that of
desktops where there are little limitations on what technology can be used other than the
operating system. Future research should focus on how privacy enhancing technologies
have developed for mobile devices as well as how terms and conditions are implemented
in mobile apps.
5.2 Conclusion
The United States has a long way to go in terms of protecting online privacy. The
majority of the legal protections are laws that were enacted long before the Internet was
commercially available and were just applied to the Internet as if it were any other
technology. With no federal law protecting privacy on a universal level for adults, there
is room for improvement. The burden of protecting online privacy has fallen to the user
who is expected to read an obscene amount of text found in terms of use agreements and
determine how to respond if they do not agree with the terms presented to them. If they
do not agree, but have no choice but to sign or didn’t read the terms until after they
already signed the agreement they are left to using technological means to protecting
their privacy. Overall, situation in regards to protecting online privacy in the United
States is grim. While there is most certainly room for improvement, it may take over a
decade before any true progress is made. Until then, the best hope for privacy is that the
technological protections outpace the threats to online privacy.
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